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![]() Content Chapter 1, control, made to measure Chapter 2, administrative apartheid ![]() Chapter 4, Own people, first or last? Chapter 5, Exclusion as an ideological instrument Chapter 6, And technology, it grew on ... |
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The border which, according to the Europe of the citizen, should
be open, is closed for a specific group of people. Since the sec-
ond of May 1994 hundred thousands of people are yearly confronted
with a border control. How these people are selected remains
unclear, that there is a selection is clear though. The control
determines if you get access to the Netherlands. You have just met
the Mobil Surveillance Foreigners (MTV).
The MTV operates behind and along the whole border, in interna-
tional trains, on motorways, roads and in harbours. Each MTV-team
checks motorways mainly near a main border post but also on bor-
dercrossings in the proximity. Next to that the MTV-teams comb out
the international trains that enter the Netherlands daily. The
controls are done on the basis of a random test on the spot. Total
border control is not the issue, after all: there is free movement
of persons and goods. Checks are executed as soon as people who
cross the border, have passed, so that formally it is proven that
someone has actually crossed the border. This is important when
illegals are found. There are three sorts of border controls by
MTV-teams: in international trains and busses, on roads and in sea
harbours.
The teams checking the international trains are made up by mare-
chaussee's (military police), who are taken over the border by
car, into Germany or Belgium, to a train station. There they get
on the train, usually at the rear end. Then they go through the
train. Sometimes they check everybody on the train, but usually
they check specific passengers, for identity papers. In fact, it
is not a passport control, since they have been abolished. It is a
selective passport control. If the MTV should encounter a person
who can not produce a valid identity paper, these are usually
taken out of the train at the first station behind the border
(Arnhem, Maastricht, Venlo, Breda, Roosendaal, Terneuzen). At the
railway station the MTV has got its own checkpoint, there they do
the first control on personal information.
The teams checking the motorways consist of two officers on motor-
bikes who carry out the first selection prior to the control. They
drive behind the car they want to be checked and stop them at the
parking place where the MTV-post is set up, existing out of a
bigger and a smaller bus. The motorised officers go back to their
spot along the motorway, to select the next vehicle. The control
of identity-papers takes place by other MTV-officers, who contact
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) from the bus, to
see if the person is registered in the Administration System (-
VAS?) and the National Schengen Information System (NSIS). They
also have a link with Schiphol, through a wireless mobil computer.
This is to find out if the person concerned is registered in the
Tracing Register (OPS). In the MTV-bus different equipment for
control is available: fax, mobil phone, xerox machine, laptop
computer, handbooks with an up-dated tracing register etc. All
occupants of the car are checked, including their luggage. If the
identity papers are in order, you can go, unless the MTV finds and
registers something else, for example a driving licence out of
date or that there is no insurance on the car. If the identity
papers are not in order then the person is taken into an office at
the parking-place where s/he is questioned and photo's and finger-
prints are taken. The information is then stored in NSIS.
Through sea harbours like Amsterdam, Rotterdam and IJmuiden, stow-
aways arrive on board of ships, even though the area is under
strict control. The MTV patrols along different zones. Control
often takes place outside the harbour, at sea. A fine is set on
transporting stowaways, a similar sanction as airplane companies
get if they transport people without documents. With ships the
fine is 2500 guilders. The chance that a ship is 'chained' for
further investigation is high and scares captains. The MTV also
execute random controls in the harbour itself, for border crossing
and other documents, at the bridge of the ship or in the captains
quarters. Stowaways that are found have to stay on board or are
expulsed by plane, if they do not apply for asylum.
Criteria for selection and apprehension are not strict, but are,
for example, the appearance of the car and the occupants. The bad
state of the car, or if it is very expensive, the licence plate,
the way of driving, an 'overloaded' van, a number of cars appar-
ently driving in column, 'with lots of luggage and occupants'.
According to the MTV they are refugees or illegal families trying
to cross the border.
Usually the papers of those controlled are in order and they can
continue. Often they are coloured/black people who are Dutch, have
been naturalised or have a residence permit. When people do not
have papers or the papers are not in order, false, falsified or
not valid as a document for crossing the border, then photo's and
fingerprints are taken. Also registered is personal information
like: name, date of birth, country of origin, status in the Neth-
erlands or outside and when relevant: country of passage, country
of prior residence, antecedents and other personal information.
These are registered and compared with information in the computer
of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), the (N)SIS
and the Tracing Register (OPS). When unknown, these personal data
are stored in the central computer system, the Schengen Informa-
tion System (SIS). Papers are checked for authenticity with fraud-
checking equipment (retro-check), when the MTV suspects that they
might be false or have been falsified. The proces-verbal made in
case of illegal crossing of the border or when carrying a false
document is also registered.
When illegal border-crossers are registrated, the next step can be
that the existing procedures, as in the agreements of return and
adoption, are followed. The person is then transferred to the
authorities of the neighbouring country or a person gets the order
to turn back and return on their own means. When there is more
time available for a further investigation into the identity, the
person in question can be transferred to the regional police. They
are then detained in a police cell. This form of detention can
last up to ten days, after which the person has to be transferred
to a prison for illegal foreigners. Detention can then take
months, there is no maximum time limit. When expressedly applying
for asylum, which sporadically happens according to the statistics
in the year reports of '94 and '95 of the Marechaussee1, the person
is transferred to the IND in an Application Centre (AC). The right
to asylum is not under the jurisdiction of the MTV. It is imposs-
ible to control if the MTV actively points out the right to an
asylum request, and if they are willing to hear the word "asiel".
The history of the Marechausse on Schiphol shows that this was not
always the case.2
The Marechausse is a link in the execution of the Foreigners Bill.
They have a task of guarding the borders at the main entrypoints
at the air- and sea-ports, at the outer border of Schengen.
Besides that the Marechaussee works at the eastern and southern
border of the Netherlands. They also work together with the Immi-
gration and Naturalisation Service (IND) at the expulsion of asy-
lum-seekers whose procedure has ended and illegal foreigners.
Because of this, the Marechaussee is present at the Application
Centre's (AC's), which were set up for a fast processing of the
asylum applications. The MTV uses, since '94, MOBILIST, the Mobil
National Information System. In '96 this automated process has
grown further. Not only can the Tracing System (OPS) and (N)SIS be
consulted but there is also the possibility to check if someone is
wanted for a felony, in the Central Reference Index of the Recog-
nition System (HKS). Moreover the files of the State Service for
Roadtraffic (RDW) and the Central Driving Licence Register (CRR)
are directly accessible by the MTV. To be able to execute the
Schengen agreements a start has been made to make modifications
and apply different functions in the Project Automating Schiphol
(PAS), to be able to support all activities in an automated way.
These Schengen agreements also compel to link the PAS and the
(N)SIS.
The MTV has been instated to counter immigration in an early
stage. Kosto, the former under-secretary of the Ministry of Jus-
tice, reported soon after the start of the MTV, that these flying
borderpatrols had a diminishing effect on the number of asylum-
seekers. His colleague Nawijn, then head of the IND, attributed
this decline fully to the intensified border control. Initially
the Marechaussee's used for the MTV were deployed from Schiphol.
By physically separating Schengen and non-Schengen passengers the
airport would need less personnel to control. Because this separ-
ation was delayed, the MTV started with less people then original-
ly planned, 200 instead of 473. A part of the 273 missing stayed
at Schiphol to check 'manually'. From the start of '96 the separ-
ation is in working order and the MTV is complete. This means that
the control activities are in principal taking place 24 hours a
day.
The Foreigners circulaire (Vc) of 1994, supplemented with further
proceedings, and the border circulaire, both have guidelines about
the border(area) control. Within these, the margins of the inter-
nal surveillance of foreigners within the border area's are
defined: 'Surveillance to counter illegal immigration is surveil-
lance directed to counter illegal residence by illegal immigra-
tion, organised or not, in an as early as possible stage; this
surveillance is directed to prevention and discouragement of
future illegal immigration.'4 The selectively reintroduced border
control is apparently also directed to another goal: 'controls on
people travelling into the country also produce indications to the
extent of which a route is used for illegal immigration.'4 The Vc
1994 further states, under the heading of 'further directions':
'All persons, Dutch and non-Dutch, of whom can be assumed that
they are border-crossers, can be subjected to this form of sur-
veillance of foreigners. Concrete indications of illegal resi-
dence, are not necessary in this form of surveillance.'4 This means
that the Foreigners Bill (Vw), in certain extent, applies to ev-
eryone. In the magazine Migrantenrecht of september '95 doubt is
cast on if this form of surveillance of foreigners by which every-
one who crosses the border can be controlled, is valid with the
Foreigners Bill itself and the Vc.5 The Vc 1994 continues its mar-
gins and directions: 'A good insight in traffic, both on motorways
and secondary roads as with international traintraffic, is an
essential condition for an effective policy of control. This
insight can be obtained by observation of traffic and analysis of
the data obtained by observation.'
Some time after the start of the flying squads of the MTV, the
Commander of the MTV-squad Heerlen stated the following: 'Of
course the MTV has a preventive effect and the number of illegal
immigrants on the currently known routes will decrease. But as
long as the honeyjar is filled, from far away and nearer places,
people will keep on streaming to the Netherlands and try to find
new routes, again and again. You will only score a hundred percent
when you close the whole border off with a wall.'6 Highest priority
of the MTV is to avert asylum-seekers. Sergeant-major Gloudemans,
coordinator of the MTV Breda: 'Priority number one is to dam in
the stream of potential asylum-seekers and to apply a sort of pre-
selection. In this we succeed pretty well. In the month of January
for example, exactly one person qualified for asylum, while over
'94 we only noted 42 asylum-seekers.'7
The MTV is not by itself as an instrument to counter illegal immi-
gration. The internal surveillance of foreigners has also been
intensified in other aspects. In 1994 the police forces got extra
reinforcements to trace illegal immigrants and refugees whose
procedures have ended. About the specific employment of the extra
capacity for the surveillance of foreigners, the Ministry of Jus-
tice and the directors of the police forces have made agreements.
The existence of these agreements became known with the leaking of
a letter of the management of the region Hollands-Midden (Middle
of Holland, Leiden and surrounding). According to this letter, it
was ..'agreed to increase the number of removals from 300 to about
550.' On february second 1995 questions were asked about these
agreements in Parliament. Under-secretary Schmitz of the Ministry
of Justice replied that no quota agreement existed and that a
publication in the newspaper Trouw must be based on a misunder-
standing. Schmitz called the extra money for the internal surveil-
lance of foreigners a 'targeted benefit'. The agreements are based
on '.. further executive agreement about the way in which the
wanted intensification can be concretely organised. (..) These
results will be judged in their mutual coherence and in combina-
tion with the total amount of efforts taken in the field of inten-
sification of surveillance of foreigners.' Schmitz states that
there will be judged on the quota, but that there haven not been
any hard agreements made. Shortly after this the director of the
police in the Region Flevoland is much more honest, he states in
Trouw of september first '958, that agreements have been made about
the numbers, and that there are consequences for the budget when
they do not reach the amount agreed. Raising the number of
removals has thus become a question of making quota-agreements and
realising the targeted number of removals, after which the results
are judged by The Hague. Although the police forces have a certain
freedom in spending the extra money (most of the forces have used
it to extend the capacity for the implementation of the Foreigners
Administration System (VAS)), concretely it has to lead to an
increase in the number of expulsions.
The decision to intensify the internal surveillance of foreigners
was taken by the previous cabinet. Besides the earlier mentioned
agreement, different tracing services have been extended, for
example the Inspection Service Social Affairs and Labour (ISZW),
the former Inspection Service Labour (DIA). Also the Bill on Iden-
tification has come into working and measures have been taken to
punish employers with illegals in their service more severely. The
previously mentioned extension of personnel at the police forces
also meant an extension of the number of (formation)places at the
IND. On the twelfth of May 1995 in the IND district South-East 800
persons extra were deployed at the Southern forces and the IND.
This effectively meant 118 extra jobs for the police forces. "An
essential stipulation for the functioning of the foreigners ser-
vices is a clear, just and credible acting of the government as a
whole: illegal foreigners have to be removed from the Netherlands.
(...) In the future criminal foreigners -both legal and illegal-
and expulsion of illegals has the utmost priority in the South",
according to Wilma Engelhart, head of the department Foreigners of
the police in Brabant Zuid-oost, at the conclusion of the earlier
mentioned agreement on the twelfth of May 1995. Thus the year 1996
will be, more than the previous years, centred towards the policy
of expulsion.
In the neighbouring countries a form of mobil surveillance is in
operation, too: in Germany the BundesGrenzschutz and in Belgium
the Rijkswacht. They also operate behind the border and there is
cooperation with the MTV with transfer(ence), return and take-
over. In the Schengen Executive Agreement (SUO) arrangements have
been fixed about the guarding of the outer borders of Schengen,
like at Schiphol. Or like at the Oder-Neisse border between Ger-
many and Poland, where, at night, the territory is also searched
with infra-red camera's by the German and Polish border police.
Many have drowned in this river, in their attempt to enter the
Schengen territory. The same can be said about those who tried to
cross the mediterranean outer border of Western Europe in little
boats.
In the summer of 1995 the MTV existed one year. At that moment 210
marechaussee's were active in the MTV. In the decision in 1993 it
was expected to be 473, a capacity that was realised in january
1996. One of the problems judging the practice of the MTV is that
there is hardly any other material available than that of the
Ministry of Justice. The reliability of those figures is debatable
and a framework for comparison is not available.
1 Statistics from the year reports of the Marechausse of 1994 and
1995.
An identity control by the flying squads of the MTV proves disas-
trous for John. He is travelling by train to a friend in Germany.
On his way back, when they are near Enschede, the MTV enters the
train. The Marechaussee's are uniformed, but do not show any iden-
tification. John is the only one in the compartment to be checked.
He can not show any valid identity papers. A reduction abonnement
of the Dutch rail company is of no avail. John is taken to an
office in the station and later taken to the police station Ensch-
ede, where he will stay in a cell that week. His girlfriend and
daughter can visit him once. They are separated from him by a
glass wall. Research is conducted into his identity, his girl-
friend is also questioned at her house. This research produces no
more than was already known about John from the computer. He is
transferred to the prison for illegal foreigners Willem II in
Tilburg. There he is held for five months and is put in the isola-
tion cell for two weeks once, because out of desperation, he tries
to commit suicide. The Ministry of Justice can not expulse him and
puts him on the street. On his entry in the Netherlands as an asy-
lum seeker, John was also dumped on the street, after months of
detention in the 'grenshospitium' in Amsterdam. He is registered
as technically non-expulsable. This also showed up when he was
arrested in the subway for not having a ticket, for lack of
money. Still, this third time he is imprisoned, and chances are
that he will be imprisoned many more times.
Matty is checked on february twelfth '95 by the MTV, on his return
to the Netherlands by car. He crosses the border together with
another person, who has a definite residence permit in the Nether-
lands and is therefor allowed to cross the border. Matty is taken
out of the car and enters the merry-go-round of controls. The
other person can continue. Matty is turned over to the regional
police and kept in a police cell for ten days. After that he is
kept for nearly seven and a half months in the illegals prison
Willem II. After that he is transferred to the border-jail in
Amsterdam. During the time Matty is imprisoned, the Ministry of
Justice does hardly any investigation into his identity, while to
the outside world they act as if they are working hard towards his
expulsion. After nine months of foreigners detention, in which a
lot of misery, loneliness and isolation, he is released immediate-
ly, to return into illegality. He has won his fifth trial, in
which his lawyer has demanded release from foreigners detention.
The first four cases he had lost; every time the Ministry was
given more time by the judge to keep him and investigate. Suddenly
Matty is at the mercy of the streets again. He pretty much picks
up his live again, but of course he has lost his job during this
period of detention.
Eyenga gets on the train just behind the border in a train which
comes from Belgium. Eyenga is taken by the MTV at a check in the
train. He has bad luck, since he has left his papers at home, a
ROA-house (asylum seekers preferential housing scheme). A request
to pick them up is of no avail. Eyenga is taken for further con-
trol. It seems that he shirked the obligation to report a couple
of times, which means he did not report at the foreigners police
for a stamp in time. This was because Eyenga was staying with his
girlfriend, who lives very far away. After neglecting this obliga-
tion a number of times, he was sanctioned. At this control this is
used against him: Eyenga is a danger to the public order, because
he failed to report a few times. The Ministry of Justice sees him
as a person to potentially go into hiding. He is detained for
nearly five months in the prison for illegals Willem II in Til-
burg. In this time he is put in the isolation cell for the stan-
dard term of two weeks, because he did not obey an order directly.
From the jail he is dumped on the street, without any provision.
From asylum seeker, Eyenga has now become an illegal. |
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