European cooperation and opposition

The spectacular mutual deportation actions of 1995, in which the Netherlands, Germany and France, deported people from Zaire in charter flights, appeared to be a new step in the European policy of deportation. However, since then it has become more quiet. The european member-states only wearisome come to cooperation in this field.

In the whole of Europe refugees, whose procedures have ended, and illegal foreigners are daily deported. In France the total number of deportations rose with 25 percent in 1996. Including the use of 35 special charter-flights, over 23,000 people were deported. The Minister of Justice Debr‚ declared that there was a need for two charters a week. Spain has proven to be very apt in dumping African asylum-seekers arbitrarily in any African country that wants them. With a bonus of two hundred dollar Spain tries to convince the countries to take the refugees in, whether that is the country where they come from or not. Belgium uses the services of a company specialised in the deportation of 'difficult cases', as was shown in Chris de Stoop's book on the European deportation policy. Germany is now getting ready to deport 300,000 Bosnian refugees to Bosnia which is, in the eyes of the German government, again safe enough to return to.
The European countries are not satisfied however. The every day practice learns that a number of groups of refugees are hard to remove. These are refugees whose identity is difficult to establish and those of which the countries of origin refuse to cooperate with the deportation. Often these two go hand in hand. According to international law, states are obliged to take their citizens back. However this rule is bent quite often. According to the same international rules, a state whereto will be deported, has to agree with the arrival of these people. A large number of countries refuse to take back their citizens who are to be deported, for various reasons.

Chats over dinner

In a report CIREFI, research-centre of the European Union which gathers and exchanges information about the asylum- policy of the member-states, sums up the problems that member- states encounter. Often it is difficult to establish the identity of refugees, since not every country has a perfected civil adminstration system. In the report, Germany remarks sourly that in the case of Bangladesh, Algeria and China "all information is checked in the country of origin until infinity." France grumbles that the embassy of Angola "refuses to extend laissez-passers." Moreover the embassy lets refugees, presented to them to establish their identity, "sign a statement in which the person concerned, acknowledges not to be an Angolan, but being from Zaire." Only 6.8 percent of the deportations to Angola succeed, the French delegation calculates with almost un-French precision.
Other countries only take citizens who return voluntarily or they state all kinds of supplementary demands. Sometimes there is no embassy or the diplomatic relations are not too well. There is continuous deliberation with embassies and sometimes pressure, subtle or not, is exerted to get them to cooperate. Jan Mulder, the COA-director of the Removal Centre Ter Apel, described it this way: " Laissez-passers are based on agreements with embassies. That means to establish relationships, going to dinners, the diplomatic relations have to be strengthened sometimes."

Safe Third Countries

The 'problematic' countries all lie outside of Europe. Therefor most of the deportations are to European countries. According to the figures in 'De keten in kaart' ('the chain mapped'), an internal report of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), this runs up to about 50 percent of the total number of deportations in the Netherlands. According to the IND this is due mainly to practical reasons. It is easier to obtain (substitute) travel documents, the travel opportunities are larger and different means of transport are available. How this figure relates to the other European member-states is unclear. The figures of CIREFI only show that in the first half of 1996 50,000 deportations have taken place.
The relatively easy deportations within Europe are a consequence of the European cooperation in this area. A number of juridical frameworks have been developed, which e.g. facilitate the obtainment of transit-visa for refugees who have to pass through another country to be deported. There is also information exchange in Schengen about 'favourable removal opportunities', as it is called. The member-states keep each other informed on the problems which they encounter in their national practice and the solutions they have found for it.
The strongest weapon that has come out of the European cooperation so far, is the principle of 'safe third countries'. According to this principle the European countries do not take into account applications for asylum of refugees who have travelled to Europe through such a 'third safe country'. The argument being that they should request asylum in that 'safe country'. By declaring all the countries of Middle- and Eastern-Europe to 'safe countries', the European Union tried to block the gaps in her Eastern border, which came into existence through the fall of the communist regimes there.

Sanitary Belt

Linked to this principle are the so-called 'agreements of return'. The Schengen-Poland agreement is model for these kind of agreements. In this agreement Poland obliges itself, for their own costs, to take back foreigners who have travelled into Schengen area through Poland, and are not allowed to stay. These can be illegal foreigners but also refugees whose asylum request was denied or not taken in. In this way Poland functions as a border-post for the Schengen-states. It is in their own benefit to prevent illegal foreigners or refugees travelling into Schengen area. Now that similar agreements have been concluded with all the countries of Middle- and Eastern-Europe, a sanitary belt has been laid around Europe. In reaction these countries conclude agreements with their neighbouring countries. For example, agreements have been made with Belarus, which is not even a party in the Refugee Treaty of Geneva. This way a slide has been created in which refugees, trying to get to Europe, are returned from country to country, without their asylum-request being reviewed. In a commentary on the practice of return-agreements, the commission Meijers, a group of experts in the field of asylum law, gave sharp criticism. The commission states that the agreements have mainly been designed to easily use the 'safe third country' principle and to facilitate the removal of illegal foreigners. In the return-agreements are no safe- guards against 'refoulement'. This is the risk that a refugee is being sent back to the country which he or she has fled, without having had the chance to apply for asylum. Moreover it pressures states to tightly seal their borders, and that too undermines the right to asylum. The commission is therefor of the opinion that "it is not legitimate to apply the return- agreements for asylum-seekers."

shifting the problem

Practically the system does not yet work, the way it was designed. This can mainly be contributed to the major differences in interests between the European member-states. In words solidarity is preached when it concerns the mutual 'problem' of refugees. In reality they are busy trying to skid the problem. An example: an Afghan applies for asylum in the Netherlands. He or she has not entered the country through Schiphol airport. According to the European regulations the Netherlands are not responsible for the application: only foreigners that have come through the outer-border will be taken in the procedure. Another European state is responsible for the Afghan refugee, the state where he or she has first entered.

Then the problems of proof arise. How are the Netherlands going to prove that the refugee from the example has come to the Netherlands through Germany, Belgium, France or Italy? Since no country is eager to take the responsibility, they are not easily convinced. Refugees are turned inside out in the hope to find a hotel receipt, a train ticket, a pen or a packet of cigarettes that can prove through which country they have travelled. If this prove can not been given, then there is only a suspicion which country is responsible. And that is not enough, as the government recently declared in a letter to the Second Chamber of Parliament. "If there is only a suspicion of responsibility, the two member-states have to come to agreement in deliberation, which in practice does not occur often."

The perspective that the then under-secretary of Justice Kosto saw in Schengen appears to falter. Kosto told the Second Chamber that only sixteen percent of the refugees arrived in the Netherlands through the outer border. The rest would no longer be Dutch responsibility. In a letter to the Second Chamber the government calculates that 65 percent of the asylum requests which they take in, are not their responsibility. "Schengen has not yet brought what should be expected on ground of the theoretical conclusive concept" sighs the now under-secretary Schmitz in her letter.

Obligation to take back

In reality the Netherlands are left with refugees which they have to try to remove themselves. To its misfortune the Dutch government finds that the countries from which the most asylum-seekers come, show the least willingness to cooperate. That is why the Netherlands, together with Germany, have been lobbying for years in the European Union, to mutually pressurise these countries. In reference to the Middle- and Eastern-european countries they want to close return- agreements with these countries.

The Netherlands and Germany want to enclose in all the trade- agreements of the European Union, a standard regulation that obliges to take back illegal foreigners and refugees whose procedure have ended. The pressure of the European Union - and the interest of third countries to get access to the European unitary market - would be greater than pressure on bilateral level. Here again the interests of especially the Netherlands and Germany collide with those of other member-states. In the Southern states, for example, who have a differently structured economy, the presence of illegal immigrants is thought less troublesome. Even more than in the Northern states large parts of the Southern economies are reliant on illegal labour. These countries see little in burdening trade- negotiations with return-agreements. "There is much different thought about including obligations for return in trade- political agreements, because not every state is confronted with the same problems of return" so wrote the government to the Second Chamber last year.
Some results have been achieved though. In negotiations with Morocco a kind of return-agreement has been included to the trade-agreement. But with countries like Israel, Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Lebanon the negotiations still linger on. Christian-democrat CDA-parliamentary Maxime Verhagen thinks that Morocco is the school example of how it should be done. According to him the European Commissioner Metoutez has placed Morocco under pressure, amongst others with information the Amsterdam police provided about the unwillingness of Morocco to take back Moroccan criminals. He paraphrased the Commissioner saying: "Boys, you can talk all day but this agreement will only be reached when a return-agreement is included." Verhagen's conclusion is clear: "Because of the pressure exercised, Morocco accepted and not because it was politely asked." Thus the CDA repeatedly pleads not to conclude bilateral trade-agreements, when there is not yet a solution for the problems of return.

'Voluntary Return'